Fingerprint Training Available for Attorney's

One of theme that runs through most of my blogs is the importance of having fingerprint evidence evaluated by a fingerprint expert. In theory this is a reasonable request, but practically, it may be cost prohibitive. An alternative is to have someone in the office receive the same basic training that a fingerprint expert would receive. The trained individual while not an expert would e the knowledge to evaluate a fingerprint case and:



know when to contract a fingerprint expert.

know if all the fingerprints were searched properly.

understand the importance of unidentified latents.



The training would be invaluable for a prosecutor or defense attorney's office. A course has been developed by FBIS-LLC available on-line in mid-January, that would offer the flexibility required to allow someone from a busy attorney's office to complete this type of fingerprint training. The training program is similar to what a new fingerprint examiner would receive at the state or federal level. Since the course is on-line there are no set hours of attendance or timetable for completion.

I also want to point out the training could be used by state and local law enforcement agencies and student's (criminal justice and para-legal programs), as a a basic fingerprint training course, with the ability to utilize the training in an agency remediation program. If you have any questions please visit our website http://www.fingerprintconsultingservices.com/ or contact us at fbis@cox.net


Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case #4 application of the 1 discrepancy rule

As every examiner knows, latent and exemplar images are never exactly the same. The reasons are many; how the exemplar was recorded or where the latent was deposited, etc. The experienced examiner during the analysis and evaluation must be able to understand and explain any discrepant points found in either the latent or examplar images. In this case we had experienced examiners determine the discrepant points of identification were the result of latent distortion, probably caused by the bag. The examiners made a subjective determination which was incorrect. The panel noted theFBI examiners failed to follow the 1 discrepancy rule , if there is 1 unexplainable discrepancy in either the latent or exemplar image an individualization cannot be made. In this case the examiners did re-evaluate the prints and tried to get the Spanish examiners to agree with the FBI examiners individualization, I don't think they ignored the rule , they felt they could explain the discrepancies. The examiners would have given the Spanish examiners their interpretation of reasons for he discrepant points.

The thing to remember is if highly skilled and experienced examiners, which each of these examiners is can make this type of mistake, what about the less skilled and experienced examiners. Most individualization's are done by examiners with much less experience and training than the FBI examiners. Currently the most effective prevention is for the defense or court to have the fingerprint evidence re-evaluated by an unbiased 3r party.

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case;Problem #3 Faulty reliance on Level III Detail

In the Mayfield case the FBI examiners increased the total minutiae they felt they had from 10 points of Level II detail to 15 total points utilizing level III detail. Level III detail can include a number of things from ridge shape and pores to scars and this information can be beneficial in individualization when properly used. It would appear that they continued the " circular reasoning " utilizing the level III detail. The examiners justified the the ten level II points based on the level III detail; ridge shape,pore placement and incipient dots. While I did not see the original images, from what I was able to see, the latent lacked clarity. On poor quality images it is very difficult to obtain reliable level III detail, the such small ridge characteristics are usually compromised by background clutter and distortion. The FBI had several different copies of Mayfields know prints and some of the level III detail was not present in all the copies, which should have caused the examiners concern. While level III detail can be helpful, it becomes less helpful as clarity decreases. I want to emphasize how important it is to utilizie multiple copies of an inked image if they are available when working poor quality images.

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case, unclassified executive summary. Reason #2

The 2nd. significant factor noted by the OIG was the examiners of some features adjusted or influenced by "backward " reasoning. In effect after determining 10 points of "unusual similarity" the examiners found additional features by working backward from Mayfields file print. The examiners found features in the exemplar and then looked for them in the latent image resulting in "murky or ambiguous details" being erroneously identified as points. When an examiner is dealing with a poor quality latent that lacks clarity, it is tempting to look at the exemplar and work backward but as is clear from the Mayfield case it can have disastrous results. This backward or circular reasoning allowed the examiners in Mayfield to report up to 17 points of identification. A jury or defense attorney presented with a case like Mayfield would be ill equipped to determine that an error had occur ed and then convince a jury of the error.

If you watch any of the shows that highlight current criminal trials ,you'll often hear the analyst talk about having 8 points in fingerprints as a standard, they indicate if there are 8 points the print is an identification. I would suspect many lawyers are under the same impression that if there are 8 points case closed, as we see in Mayfield this is not the case. I would also go back to the point I've made numerous times in the past; the examiners in the Mayfield case all had more training and experience than most examiners testifying in court today. Even highly experienced latent examiners with training can make an identification error, the only way to prevent the error from causing disastrous on sequences is to have the evidence evaluated by an experienced examiner.

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

Additional Point on Item 1 of the FBI Report

One other point I would like to make so it's not lost in item 1 of the FBI report. The 10 of the points of identification finally used to identify Daoud,were also used by the FBI to incorrectly identify Mayfield. Why is this significant? most cases of fingerprint identification accepted in court today are brought in by latent examiners with less experience and training than the FBI examiners. With no "systematic study of the rarity" of finding such a constellation of similar points of identification, how can we expect less experienced examiners to make identifications on similar difficult identifications.

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

A Review of the FBI's Handling of the Brandon Mayfield Case, unclassified executive summary.

Went back over the executive summary on the Mayfield error back in 2004 and want to discuss what the Office Inspector General determined were the causes of the error as well as what the OIG suggested to prevent similar errors in the future.
The report listed six (6) causes for the error and in this blog I'd like to discuss the 1st. major contributing factor in the error. The OIG found the primary cause of the error was the similarity in Mayfield's print with the latent found in Spain. " Despite the unusual similarity in the relationship between points on the Mayfield and Daoud prints, Mayfield and Daoud did not have identical fingerprints." It also pointed out there are no studies on how often situations similar to this occur but anecdotal reports this as a rare occurrence. The identification was an IAFIS suspect and as the OIG pointed out "The enormous size of the IAFIS database and power of the IAFIS program can find a confusingly similar print." The OIG in my opinion was correct in highlighting this as the major factor in the error. As databases increase and algorithms improve there will be more suspects produced, that will have unusual similarity between points but will not be the individuals print.
So can this type of error be prevented ? There will continue to be similar errors we can minimize the numbers with training and utilization of fingerprint experts for the defense. In the Mayfield case you had four (4) experienced and well trained fingerprint examiners that made this bad identification.


Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

The waiting game

The following article brought out a number of good points;
http://www.suburbanchicagonews.com/beaconnews/news/1781113,2_1_AU21_PRINTS_S1-090921.article
"And of course, he wants the assailant caught as soon as possible, which is why the seven-month wait for a fingerprint match has him upset. Police do have a match on the suspect now, he said, but now they're asking his relative to identify someone she hasn't seen in seven months. " A backlog causing a delay like this not only increases the likelihood of additional criminal activity by the criminal but also the possibility of an escalation in the violence in future crimes.
The other point made by this article: "Aurora's crime lab doesn't: an Automated Fingerprint Identification System, or AFIS. According to Leroy Keith, an Aurora alderman who also works as assistant director of DuPage County's crime lab, the equipment itself costs about $50,000. But that's not the big expense: You also need people trained to make the final matches." As indicated in earlier blogs having trained latent fingerprint examiners requires 2 yr's minimum of full time training to become a competent examiner. The expense and time can often tempt smaller agencies to not fully commit to the required training increasing the possibility for error.
While technology continues to improve we should expend similar resources to insure the individuals working with the automated systems are the highly trained individuals required for the systems.
Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

Another Erroneous Fingerprint Identification

Posted an article in a number of places a few days ago from the NY Daily News about a large settlement for an individual incarcerated for 523 days because of an error in a fingerprint comparison. The thing that caught my eye 1st. was the liability cost,which while significant was not exorbitant.

Then I looked at the article again to see the real cause of the error, because unlike the FBI Mayfield error, this was just a robbery and in NYC that is not a high profile case.

So what went right and what went wrong on this fingerprint comparison. What went right was an experienced examiner who was confident enough in his skill sets said " you know what ? this is a screw; this is not his fingerprints." If it were not for this detective the individual in this case would have been convicted and gone to prison. What went wrong ? The original comparison followed the ACE-V individualization model followed by latent examiners, in that you had 2 experienced latent examiners incorrectly identify the individual. The legal aid attorney advised the victim to take a plea agreement that would have been 5 yr's, an indication that the fingerprint evidence was not re-evaluated by the defense.
So what could have been done to prevent this from happening ? As I've stated in previous blogs having fingerprint evidence evaluated by the defense is key to preventing miscarriages of justice. It is really the defense attorney who is responsible to insure the evidence is valid in the adversarial system of justice we have in the United States. I know that resources for expert testimony are limited especially for legal aid but the cost of a fingerprint evaluation should significantly less than expert testimony so it should not cost more than a service call from an electrician. The images can be sent to the expert digitally via Internet or photographs via snail mail for an initial evaluation.

Incorrect fingerprint comparisons do occur and with the automated systems producing many more suspects having strong similarities the numbers of error most likely will continue to increase. The best option currently available is for the defense to have the fingerprints evaluated by an unbiased 3rd. party.

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

Importance of making sure all fingerprints related with a high profile case are identified

Just a quick word on the importance of making sure all fingerprints related with a high profile case are identified. This Fla. case is a prime example:
http://www.tampabay.com/news/courts/criminal/court-rules-new-evidence-will-be-heard-in-polk-county-murder/1031909
When this crime occured the automated systems were not widely used,it would be 12 years before the FBI automaated fingerprint database would come on-line for local police latent units. Many agencies however continue to ignore the unidentified latent fingerprint image(s) once they have a prime suspect. The unidentified latent fingerprint(s)go into the case folder and that is the end of the investigation. What should happen with the unidentified latent fingerprint, even if an individual in a high profile case is convicted , the latent fingerp0rints should be entered into the automated fingerprint identification systems unsolved latent file. A file which will compare the unidentified latents entered against new arrest cards as they are added to the fingerprint databases. If this process does generate new suspects the fingerprints will be compared and the results returned to the investigators. The unidentified files do have a limit on the number of unidentifieds that it can handle however for most agencies it would allow the prints to be searched for quite a number of years.

Why bother for the few if any times this will occur ?

• 1st. a matter of getting the individual who actually committed the crime, a public safety issue.
• 2nd. cost, a retrial is a very costly matter. The cost of having prints searched by an automated system are insignificant even using the unidentified option.

Defense attorneys really should insure all latents have been identified and if not insure they were properly searched and stored in the systems unsolved latent file.

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

Law student was detained by Chicago PD in the Cook Co. Jail for a week before a fingerprint check revealed they had the wrong individual. The PD was unrepentant "We did what we were supposed to do --- hold him--- but it took longer than would have liked to confirm his identity" said the PD spokesman.

http://www.nbcchicago.com/news/local-beat/stolen-Identity-Leads-to-Mistaken-Arrest-55001292.html

There is no possible way that a fingerprint check of a college student should take a week. I would guess that the PD was nonchalant because "legally" they had 30 days to hold the young man. The ChicagoPD may say we are a large city with a lot of crime as a reason for the slow response, but that should not be the case. Another excuse might be they wanted to compare prints from the agency that put out the want again in today's digital world not an excuse. NYC has a 24 hr. time frame from arrest to arraignment, 3 hr's is allocated to capturing and getting a response on the arrest fingerprint card. What this means is that if this had happened in NYC the fingerprints would have been through the state and FBI fingerprint systems with the results in less than 3 hr's, most cards take less than 1 hr. If the hold up was with a comparison with prints held by another agency a simple e-mail with just 1 finger attached at 500 dpi could have been used to determine if it was the wanted individual.

If the young man was detained over a weekend it could be justified but a week is to much, I guess Chicago PD is not a community policing organization.

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

Fingerprint Training

I've been working on a basic pattern recognition and verification course which started as a project for a non criminal automated system. While I was preparing the course I realized that if I did it on line I could reach a broader audience. The course could be used by law enforcement as a basic foundation course to develop latent examiners, individuals working on automated fingerprint systems or even law offices so they could actually evaluate the fingerprint and know when they need a fingerprint expert.

In today's world dominated by the automated fingerprint identification systems training has been simplified, we no longer need to know the full fingerprint classification formula. While the classification formula has been simplified the ability to determine pattern should not be simplified. As all experienced latent or tenprint examiners know; the ability to distinguish pattern type to include the sub-groupings is critical in learning and understanding fingerprint basics. Many automated systems use pattern as a filter or binning tool to increase the speed and accuracy of the system. The fingerprint examiner has to understand the difference between a left slant loop and a central pocket loop whorl or a left slant loop and a spoiled loop tented arch. If the differences aren't understood the database gets corrupted and system accuracy will be diminished. People tend to concentrate on the experienced latent fingerprint examiner and fail to realize that the database the examiner uses is updated and maintained by individuals with far less experience and training.

A good basic pattern recognition/verification course is essential in developing a good database as well as latent examiners, preventing fingerprint errors and creating reliable search databases.




Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

How to obtain more reliable fingerprint evidence

Read the 2007 paper by Roger Koppl "CSI for Real: How to Improve Forensics Science". The paper is well written, thoughtful and accurate. The paper presents some very good ideas on how to improve the system. What caught my eye was the study of proficiency tests conducted by the Forensic Sciences Foundation (FSF) and Collaborative Testing Services (CTS) from 1978-1991.
In the fingerprint test they “attempted to simulate actual conditions by creating smudged, elongated, compressed and other irregular latent print specimens.” The best results were for
the group that included finger and palm prints, the rate of false identifications for the period was 2 percent. The researchers estimate that fingerprints appear in roughly 7 percent of felony case filings each year. Roughly 924,700 adults were convicted of a felony in State courts in 2000” and another 77,000 in U.S. district courts. These numbers suggest that about a million felony cases are brought to trial and concluded each year. Approximately 70,000 involve fingerprint evidence. It can reasonably be inferred, that of these 70,000 cases, at least 2 percent or 1,400, involve a false identification. The identification of a latent print lifted from a crime scene with an inked print from a suspect will usually produce a conviction.

The 2% figure is consider low by some, other studies have produced greater percentages of error, regardless, even a small percentage of errors produce a significant number of incorrect identifications. While not discussed in the article the number of missed identifications is significantly larger and is another cause of individuals being wrongly convicted.

While Prof. Koppl has some excellent suggestions, in the interim it is the responsibility of defense counsel to insure fingerprint evidence is accurate and reliable. The adversarial system of justice allows even fingerprint evidence to be questioned and tested to insure accuracy. In today's electronic world fingerprint evidence being brought to trial in NY, can be evaluated by an independent examiner in NE or any other state. The costs, because travel and shipping are no longer an issue, are reasonable enough that every defendant should be able to have an evaluation of the fingerprint evidence.

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

Boy Scout Fingerprint Merit Badge

I was pretty shocked to see that the requirements for fingerprint pattern classification training in some latent fingerprint certification programs is being dumbed down, to the point that the individual on the jury who earned a Boy Scout fingerprint merit badge might have had more training in fingerprint pattern recognition than the "latent expert". Fingerprint pattern recognition is not just Loops, Arches and Whorls but the ability to locate the pattern area, delta, core and sometimes tracings, a knowledge of which has often aided me in manual latent searches/comparisons.

I do realize that in many of today's automated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS), pattern is no longer a search filter. The examiner no longer needs to identify the fingerprint pattern as part of the latent fingerprint search. I would point out that probably 75% of the latent searches at the local agency level are not AFIS searches but elimination or suspect searches and a knowledge of pattern type to include things like; tracings, allow the latent examiner to more quickly and accurately do a comparison. The FBI IAFIS limits latent searches to less than a 30% penetration of the database, fingerprint pattern is a very effective way to meet that limitation. In my experience it is not uncommon to discuss difficult latent identifications in a Forensic Unit, to resolve any issues with the latent comparison (distortion, etc.) or as a training example for other latent examiners. The most effective way to discuss a latent print because of the small ridge detail is using the focal points that latent examiners understand, these are the focal points we learned in our basic fingerprint pattern recognition training. If the latent expert understands what is meant by typelines, tracings, how to determine the correct delta, core and ridge counting, the latent examiner can direct another examiner to the area of interest.
While the requirements in some certification programs for pattern recognition have been lowered, individual agencies have the ability to exceed the basic requirement and give their latent examiners a stronger fingerprint foundation in pattern recognition.

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

http://www.linkedin.com/in/fingerprintconsultingservices

http://fingerprintconsultingservices.com/

How to submit a latent fingerprint for evaluation from anywhere in the U.S

FBIS will evaluate electronic copies of a latent to tenprint identification and produce a report on the identification. The pricing for the initial evaluation of the fingerprints is such that all fingerprint cases (prosecution/defense) can be evaluated without a significant increase in the cost of the case. If there are issues with the identification, the preliminary report will detail what FBIS's findings are the report will contain recommendations if any on what options might be available to the contributor. The electronic images can be sent via e-mail or through regular mail services on memory stick, DVD or CD, and the results will be returned within a week.

http://www.fingerprintconsultingservices.com/

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

When Forensics Fail: Fingerprints

Saw a re-run of the MSNBC segment on the Upper Darby Davis homicide:

http://webmail.east.cox.net/do/redirect?url=http%253A%252F%252Fvideo.msn.com%252Fvideo.aspx%253Fmkt%253Den-us%2526brand%253Dmsnbc%2526vid%253Dd432cac1-7c65-445d-a000-7103858bad96

after a commercial on the MSNBC site you get a portion of the video on the Davis homicide.

What I couldn't believe was that the officer denied misreading the prints, even after at least 4 FBI examiners and the IAI indicated he was incorrect. In the video the officer indicated that he would be willing to sit down with the FBI so they could show him where they thought he erred. Another good description of this is page 6
http://www.courant.com/news/nationworld/chi-0410170393oct17,0,4964601.story?page=6

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

Whether a prosecutor or defense attorney you should want to insure you have an answer for the following checklist of questions:

· Is the criminal History accurate? Does the State/Local rap agree with the FBI/NCIC raps?

· Is there a F/P card for each event shown on the rap?


· Was each card accurate and legally available?

· Were latents developed in the case?

· Procedures used to determine the quality of the latent image(s):
· No value?
· Identifiable?
· Search able?


· Experience and training of examiner making the latent quality determinations?

· Suspect(s) if any provided by an investigator and the results of the comparison(s)?

· Is there a latent identification in the case?


· Was the latent identified to a digitized or hardcopy image?

· Is the hardcopy available?


· Digital enhancements if any applied to the latent or exemplar?

· If identified by afis is the database image; a single event or a composite card?


· Was the afis a local, state or FBI system?

· Policies and procedures for latent searches:
· How many times and in what systems were the latents searched?
· Was the suspect produced by afis a regular latent search or and unidentified latent search?
· If unidentified search identification was the initial verification done by a qualified latent
examiner?

· Were all suspects generated by the afis search compared with the latent image(s)?

· On an afis search are non indents looked at by 1 or 2 examiners?


· Policy and procedures for an individualization(identification):
· ACE-V used?
· Is a blind 2nd. Verification used?
· Training and experience of the examiner(s)?

· What were the scores of the other suspects produced by afis that were not identified?


· Are there any unidentified or no value latents still associated with the case?

· Will a court exhibit be produced and the images selected for the exhibit?

· Are there other identified latents not being charted in case?


· Training and experience of the examiner on initial verification?

· Training and experience of the examiner on 2nd. Verification?


· Examiners proficiency test results and is testing done on a regular basis?

· Notes and reports generated on the identification including examiner bench notes?


· Any discrepancy of opinion by any examiner(s) on the identification or quality of the latent
image?

You do no want to be surprised at trial as is clear from this list of questions there are a significant number of ways for a case to be corrupted.


Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

San Jose police withheld uncertainties in fingerprint cases

This is a case where the agency should have re-evaluated procedure. Every latent fingerprint examiner realizes there will be cases where the fingerprint clarity of the latent fingerprint may result the 2nd. examiner being unable to individualize the latent fingerprint comparison. There are a number of reasons why the latent fingerprint examiners analyst might not be able to agree on individualization. The most common reasons are:

One examiner just may have more experience.
One of the examiners may under perform.
One examiner may be pushing the envelope.

Experience, as I’ve indicated in prior blogs the experience gained by comparing thousands of fingerprints is critical to the making of a competent latent fingerprint examiner. Many labs’ concentrate on the collection/processing and the comparison is more an after thought, a good examiner needs to work at his skills daily for a number of hours. This might seem an extreme example but Tiger Woods continually practices his golf game to maintain his skill level, if he makes a mistake he will finish out of the money. A latent fingerprint examiner makes a mistake it can cost a person their freedom or possibly put someone’s life in jeopardy. Seems like we aren’t paid enough.

Underperformance, this is an agency personnel issue however by a latent fingerprint examiner not making an identification when they should it again is a public safety issue. Putting an individual back on the street that should be incarcerated endangers us all and opens an agency to $ liability. This is where an agency needs to get the examiner more training or a new position.

Pushing the envelope, the latent examiner has points of identification in agreement but because of the clarity of the image(s), a more experienced examiner is unable to individualize the identification. This is where good procedures come into play. The procedure should insure that a qualified 3 rd. latent print examiner (preferably a supervisor) analyzes the fingerprint impressions. This also can be a personnel issue and training or a new position again might be required.

The defense attorneys are correct and they should be aware of the diverging conclusion.
As Pat Wertheim said in the article "All forensic science is coming under a lot more scrutiny as to transparency in note-taking and reporting," Wertheim said last week. "You just don't sweep things under the carpet."
All agencies whether local or state need to invest in training and procedures to insure quality fingerprint identification services. The defense attorney needs to insure that the state or local agency meets their obligation.

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

Different results from Latent Fingerprint Examiners

One of the problems we as latent fingerprint examiners have is an identification conclusion that is not reproduceable. If the same latent print and fingerprint examplar are given to a different latent examiner, the conclusion returned may not be the same. The simple explaination is one examiner may have more training or experience which caused the differing conclusion, in some situations this may be true. Another answer is that an equally qualified latent examiner felt the examplar lacked sufficient clarity and could not be individualized. The second scenario is troubling, having 2 court qualified latent fingerprint examiners that aren't in complete agreement on an individualization. Is the discrepancy due to one examiner pushing the envelope or is one examiner being to conservative?

If the comparison is done by one agency then their conflict resolution procedure should resolve the issue. Even with conflict resolution this could still lead to both examiners being required to testifying in court. Another situation one agency may be more conservative in declaring an identification

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

Missed Latent Fingerprint Identifications

I've gone over a number of issues that can contribute to bad or missed identifications. I also think that over the next few years we will probably encounter more of these missed and bad identifications. ACE-V addresses only the bad identifications and as we have seen unless the procedure can be enforced and agencies improve on proficiency and remediation programs, there will continue to be bad identifications.

So we haven't discussed missed identifications, their cause and the impact they have on a case. Every latent fingerprint examiner has had cases where the latent fingerprint entered into the automated fingerprint identification system (AFIS) did not produce the identification only to identify the latent fingerprint in a subsequent search. The target fingerprint card was in file but the system did not produce the card as a suspect on the 1st. , 2nd. or sometimes 3rd. search. Additionally there are the cases where the suspect was produced but the fingerprint examiner, for whatever reason, missed the identification. On a serious crime if the investigators have no suspects the latent fingerprint will get searched multiple times and are usually the cases that produce the identification on a 2nd. or 3rd. attempt. If, however the investigator has a strong suspect and there are unidentified latents on these cases, how often do these unidentified latents get a 2nd. or 3rd. search? Because of backlogs probably not very often.

So what are the ramifications of not improving on the missed identifications ? Hope the individual continues their criminal behavior and maybe the next criminal act we get them? From a public safety view that should be unacceptable. The next crime could result in a homicide similar to the case of Jeremy Jones in Georgia.

I'd like to see the systems create and launch multiple searches from the initial input by the latent fingerprint examiner, thus the examiner only need enter the image one time. I also think all examiners should have a good understanding of the actual accuracy of the system they are working on. The vendor will have a figure in the mid 80's for latent accuracy. These figures are developed in a controlled setting with usually 25 or more points of identification on both the search and target print. Remember even in a controlled setting the system is only hitting 80 %. Most latent examiners don't have a lot of minutiae on a latent and as I've indicated previously often the target print in the file has quality issues. The answer of course is more competently trained latent examiners and an improved search algorithm for the automated fingerprint systems.

What should be done in the interim, I would suggest is the court and/or defense attorneys have a latent expert in their employ, to evaluate the latent fingerprint evidence to insure everything was done properly.



Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

Are all Agencies using ACE-V ?

When individuals look at the missed and bad identifications, the conversation usually moves to ACE-V to insure a proper fingerprint identification. Everyone is in agreement that if ACE-V is done correctly, bad fingerprint identifications should not occur. The problem is that bad fingerprint identifications occur and while everyone claims to use ACE-V, there are agencies and examiners who do not adhere to the procedure. Remember ACE-V prevents bad identifications and does nothing to prevent missed identifications.

If we look at the L.A. and Boston PD’s, we get a glimpse of what I think is one of the current problems; not all agencies are following ACE-V procedure as it was intended to be used. In the Boston case “Even the commander of the police department’s forensic technology division admitted the unit had little or no protocol or standardization of procedures. L.A “officials, described a poorly run operation, in which records and evidence were left lying around or misplaced, and supervisors "were stuck in the old way of doing things."In both instances you have large latent fingerprint operations, which were producing more latent fingerprint identifications than most state units. The policies and procedures were a priority and when you don't have a standard procedure errors will occur. Another pet peeve of mine was mentioned in Boston. "It's important that I say there are some people working in latent prints …who have really tried hard," O'Toole said. "I understand some have gone and paid on their own for training. There are some people who, the department failed them. They didn't receive appropriate training." The practice of not providing training opportunities at the local level did not only happen in Boston, unfortunately it occurs today in many local agencies and that is just not right. The latent fingerprint examiners should not have to pay for training to keep their skill level.

I think everyone involved in the judicial system will find agreement, all agencies should follow accepted practices and procedures when making a latent fingerprint identification (ACE-V). Additionally there should also be policies & procedures for proficiency testing to include a remediation fingerprint program to resolve any fingerprint training issues. What I've just indicated are found in the guidelines established by "The Scientific Working Group on Friction Ridge Analysis, Study and Technology (SWGFAST)". SWFAST has been around since 1997 and many agencies have ignored or put off utilizing the published and suggested guidelines. The guidelines were established by latent practitioners from across the country with input from all latent fingerprint examiners. The question becomes how can an agency be forced to comply and follow the guidelines? All agencies following the guidelines would benefit everyone involved in the courts and judicial system.

The agency with the ability to bring about this change, in my opinion, is the court. If the court required a periodic evaluation of policies and procedures by agencies appearing before them to insure compliance with SWGFAST guidelines many of the current problems would go away. If an agency wasn't compliant the court would not allow testimony from the agency until the non-compliance was corrected.

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

Executive Summary Strengthening Forensic Science in the United

In looking at the "Executive Summary Strengthening Forensic Science in the United
States: A Path Forward" I felt there was a glaring omission. While the report dealt with the inter-operability of the automated fingerprint identifications it did not address the database issues that should be a major concern with all local and state automated fingerprint identification systems. The poor quality fingerprint arrest card images in the search database, are a significant problem that can lead to missed and bad fingerprint identifications. A missed fingerprint identification allowing a criminal to avoid incarceration is a public safety issue. In the past this has resulted in additional criminal offenses to include homicide.

The reason that poor quality arrest card fingerprints are such a significant problem is because the number of missed and bad fingerprint identifications are significantly greater than the bad latent identifications and often directly impact regular citizens.

While the focus of this report was on the latent fingerprints, the number of useful latent fingerprints at a crime scene pales in comparison to the number of fingerprint cards processed in the course of a year. The FBI recently concluded that even when functioning well the IAFIS fingerprint system is 95% to 98% accurate. I would suggest, a realistic accuracy rate for state and local fingerprint systems would probably be closer to 90%. When this accuracy is combined with the large number of arrest and applicant fingerprint cards, you can see we are dealing with a large number of errors. Poor quality hardcopy fingerprint cards (criminal/non-criminal) increase the potential of error for the journeyman latent fingerprint examiners. A latent print is very often a poor quality image, when compared to a poor quality fingerprint card it increases the possibility of the latent fingerprint examiner making an incorrect conclusion. Since there is no minimum standard for declaring a latent fingerprint identification, examiners often declare an identification with less than 10 points of identification. 10 points, is the number of level II points of identification agreed to by all the examiners in the Mayfield bad identification. Again as noted in an earlier Blog all the latent fingerprint examiners in the Mayfield case, had significant training and experience.

The summary does have some good and important suggestions, which once implemented will improve the reliability of latent fingerprint identifications. The automated fingerprint database acceptance of poor quality fingerprint card images, will continue to produce both missed and bad identification arrest cards.

Bob McAuley
Dir. Operations/Training
Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

Madrid Bombing Bad Identification and it's Impact on current identification Procedures

There is no question the FBI latent fingerprint examiners as well as the court appointed latent fingerprint examiner had more training and experience than most fingerprint examiners employed in state and city identification laboratories. In looking at the report generated by the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) the reasons cited for the bad identification are very disturbing and should make every latent fingerprint examiner re-evaluate the criteria they use to make a determination of identification.

The report found " FBI fingerprint examiners relied in significant part on the relationship of "minutiae" or "points" within the prints. These points are places where individual ridges in the fingerprint end or split (ending ridges or bifurcations). These 10 features in Latent Finger Print 17 formed a constellation of points that was generally consistent with the constellation of points in the known fingerprints of both Mayfield and Daoud. The unusual similarity is reflected in the relative location of the points, the orientation of the ridges coming into the points, and the number of intervening ridges between the points. Although the OIG found no systematic study of the rarity of such an event, anecdotal reports suggest that this degree of similarity between prints from two different people is an extremely unusual circumstance."

As every latent fingerprint examiner knows, the minutiae/points is the level II detail. In the 70's as a latent fingerprint examiner, my agency required a minimum number of minutiae or points before a latent fingerprint examiner was allowed to testify in court to an identification. Many other agencies had similar policies. The question that this case brings up is what is the reliability of an identification with 10 or fewer minutiae or points ? I realize a lot has to do with the clarity and uniqueness of the minutiae, but when you're dealing with 10 or fewer points they are usually poor/marginal quality images.

The bias from the examplar tenprint card. " The OIG found that a significant cause of the misidentification was that the Latent Print Unit fingerprint examiners' interpretation of some features in Latent Finger Print 17 was adjusted or influenced by reasoning "backward" from features that were visible in the known fingerprints of Mayfield. This bias is sometimes referred to as "circular reasoning," and is an important pitfall to be avoided. Having found as many as 10 points of unusual similarity, the FBI fingerprint examiners began to "find" additional features in Latent Finger Print 17 that were not really there, but rather were suggested to the latent fingerprint examiners by features in the Mayfield prints. As a result of this process, murky or ambiguous details in Latent Finger Print 17 were erroneously identified as points of similarity with Mayfield's prints."

I'd like to think an experienced latent fingerprint examiner would not allow this bias to influence a decision, but even 4 experienced latent fingerprint examiners were influenced into a bad identification. The most effective way to guard against this would be to have an unbiased 3rd. party latent fingerprint examiner analyze the fingerprint without any knowledge of previous determinations.

Level III detail, "The OIG also found that the FBI latent fingerprint examiners gave significant weight to the purported agreement between extremely tiny details in Latent Finger Print 17 and Mayfield's fingerprints. These details, including shapes interpreted as individual pores, incipient dots between ridges, and ridge edges, are known as "Level 3" details. Because Level 3 details are so small, the appearance of such details in fingerprints is highly variable, even between different fingerprints made by the same finger. As a result, the reliability of Level 3 details is the subject of some controversy within the latent fingerprint community. The OIG found that none of the purported Level 3 features in Latent Finger Print 17 used to identify Mayfield corresponded to features in the known fingerprints of the true donor (Daoud). Thus, unlike the case with larger details, the examiners were not confused by any unusual similarity in Level 3 details on the fingerprints of Mayfield and Daoud. Rather, they apparently misinterpreted distortions in Latent Finger Print 17 as real features corresponding to Level 3 details seen in Mayfield's known fingerprints."

As a latent fingerprint examiner, I rely on Level II detail to make my determination of identification, I do use some Level III detail (ridge shape, etc.) in conjunction with the Level II (ending ridges, bifurcations, etc.) detail, during my comparison and evaluation of the prints. I have not had a situation where my determination of identification relied solely on Level III detail.

One discrepancy rule is followed by all latent examiners, if there is an unexplainable difference in the latent and tenprint fingerprint card, it must be declared a non-identification. "The FBI recognized that the entire upper left portion of Latent Finger Print 17 did not correspond with Mayfield's fingerprint. The examiners explained this difference as being the result of a separate touch, possibly by a different finger or a different person. This explanation required the examiners to accept an extraordinary set of coincidences. The OIG found that the support for this explanation was, at best, contradictory fingerprint examiners are governed by the "one discrepancy rule" in which a single difference in appearance between a latent print fingerprint and a known fingerprint must preclude an identification unless the examiner has a valid explanation for the difference. Latent fingerprint identifications are subject to a standard of 100 percent certainty. Implicit in this standard is the requirement that the examiner have equivalent certainty in the validity of each explanation for each difference in appearance between prints."

"The OIG also found that the FBI examiners failed to give adequate consideration to the incomplete nature of the agreement in points between Latent Finger Print 17 and Mayfield's fingerprint. As previously described, there was a constellation of as many as 10 points in LFP 17 that bore an unusual similarity to points in the Mayfield fingerprint. However, the limited clarity of Latent Finger Print 17 prevented, the latent fingerprint examiners from making an accurate determination of the type of many of these points (that is, whether they were ending ridges or bifurcations). The OIG found that many of the points utilized by the FBI to support the identification suffered from this shortcoming (ambiguity as to feature type), and that accordingly the "quality" of the agreement was inadequate to support the conclusion of identification." Apparently the latent fingerprint examiners allowed themselves to be influenced by each other and the tenprint fingerprint card.

What is clear from the Madrid bombing error is that even highly trained and experienced latent fingerprint examiners can make identification errors. Most latent fingerprint examiners testifying in court today, don't have near the training or experience of the 4 individuals above and often the identification is based on the opinion of only 1 latent fingerprint examiner. The automated fingerprint identification systems today are designed to find candidate fingerprints having the most minutiae arrangements similar to the encoded minutiae from the latent fingerprint. These candidates should include the correct match of the print (if it is in the database), but will also include the closest possible non-matches. These close non-match suspects require more fingerprint comparison experience than many of today's latent examiners have been able to acquire.

Bob McAuley

Dir. Operations/Training

Forensic Biometric Identification Solutions LLC.

"It takes 10 years of extensive training to excel in anything" Herbert Simon - Nobel Laureate

Scientific research has concluded that it takes eight-to-twelve years of training for a talented player/athlete to reach elite levels. This is called the ten-year or 10,000 hour rule, which translates to slightly more than three hours of practice daily for ten years (Ericsson, et al., 1993; Ericsson and Charness, 1994, Bloom, 1985; Salmela et al., 1998).

Does this apply to latent fingerprint examiners? and how does this impact latent fingerprint accuracy? I think everyone will agree that today latent fingerprint examiners have the opportunity to identify many more latent fingerprints than in the past, largely due to the automated fingerprint identification systems. I would estimate that 20 to 30% of the cases identified in my Lab. were cold hits ( fingerprint suspects produced by the automated fingerprint identification system). In addition to the increase in latent fingerprint identifications, there has been a decrease in image quality of the fingerprint cards housed in state and federal databases (tenprint cards). Many fingerprint cards are still poorly acquired and the fingerprint card printers on the automated systems often don't produce a high quality image for fingerprint comparison. What does that mean for the latent fingerprint examiner? it means that today there are many more difficult latent fingerprint comparisons for the latent examiner. Are there more missed and bad fingerprint identifications today, unfortunately, yes. In addition to the increase in the number of latent fingerprints developed and searched , the automated fingerprint identification system computers find unusually close non-matching fingerprint suspects. To make a determination of identification today it will require a latent fingerprint examiner that has reached " elite levels", the individual with 10,000 hrs of fingerprint comparison work and training. Unfortunately many of the local agencies don't have the resources to develop the latent fingerprint examiner to the elite levels, often they develop a fingerprint examiner that is good at many functions (a jack of all trades). There are many fingerprint identifications that can be done by journeymen fingerprint examiners. When the latent fingerprint lift and fingerprint card are both good, the fingerprint examiner with limited experience is capable making a good decision. The problem for the journeyman fingerprint examiner is when the print lacks clarity and they are required to determine a level of tolerance for discrepancies. The answer of course is more fingerprint experience and training before the latent examiner is allowed to testify in court. Is the problem of more fingerprint comparison work before allowing the fingerprint examiner to testify in court being addressed? Unfortunately it is not and we can expect more Boston PD and L.A. PD Lab. situations from other agencies in the future. Some fingerprint programs that do appear to work are the FBI and the larger states which do allow the latent examiner to reach the elite levels of experience before they are allowed to testify in court. The FBI requires that latent fingerprint examiners make in the neighborhood of 250,000 comparisons before they are ready to testify in court. The larger state agencies, New York as an example, develop fingerprint examiners through the tenprint system as part of a career ladder. It usually takes a fingerprint examiner close to 10 yrs to work up through the system to get a chance to be a latent fingerprint examiner. Both of these systems produce excellent latent fingerprint examiners. Most PD's and smaller states, because of budgetary issues, aren't able to develop elite level latent fingerprint examiners and will become the LA or Boston storyies in the future.

Brady vs. Maryland and Giglio vs. United States

Brady vs. Maryland and Giglio vs. United States make it clear that prosecutors must disclose to the defense information which bears on the reliability or veracity of witnesses. U.S. Supreme Court decisions have enforced the "Brady Rule" to include evidence maintained in personnel files. That means that when a latent, tenprint fingerprint examiner or crime scene specialist has intentionally communicated either verbally or in writing a deceptive documented statement or message, the prosecutor must inform the defense. Intentional deceptive action in a formal setting, such as testifying in court, during an internal affairs investigation or false evidence that tends to implicate another in a criminal act, should result in termination or permanent removal from any position where the individual would be called upon to be a witness in any court action. The situation becomes less clear when the individual's actions cannot be determined to be intentional. An internal investigation might determine there was no evidence of criminal intent. An example might be an individual makes a wrong determination on a fingerprint identity, or crime scene tech. associates the wrong individual(s) with the scene based on the evidence collected. It is clear that the individual's history would be discoverable and impact the credibility of that individual testimony. What is not clear is the impact on a unit if the supervisor of the unit has the credibility issue, example the Mayfield case. If the testimony will come from another individual in the unit, does the fact that the supervisor may be perceived as having a credibility issue have any bearing on the case ?

Migration from 500ppi to 1,000ppi Fingerprint Search Database

While the decision to go to 1,000 ppi on fingerprint card capture was made some time ago it would appear that the bad economy has slowed, if not completely halted the migration. Most states have not migrated to 1,000 ppi. fingerprint card capture, so there are only a few states that find themselves in a situation where they are running automated fingerprint identification systems with search files consisting of both 500 ppi and 1,000 ppi fingerprint card images. The FBI does plan to move to 1,000 ppi fingerprint cards at some point in the future, but I would expect, that they are unable to make the move until all the large states have migrated to the 1,000 ppi fingerprint card capture systems. The issues confronting states from migrating will be cost issue's:

• Bandwidth for the higher resolution fingerprint card images.
• Conversion costs.
• Fingerprint livescan units are twice as expensive for the higher resolution units.
• System maintenance costs are a % of system cost so there is significant increase.

The problem for the larger states, is that they are dependent on the smaller agencies who submit fingerprint cards via livescan. Many smaller agencies will not be able to shoulder additional livescan and bandwidth costs.

The FBI currently will accept the 1,000 ppi fingerprint images but they are storing the high resolution fingerprint images; they downsize the fingerprint image for searching and updating to the FBI fingerprint search database. So in effect the states submitting 1,000 ppi. fingerprint images are actually getting a 500 ppi. fingerprint search. This I would suspect was originally planned as a temporary solution by the FBI until all states moved to the higher resolution fingerprint systems.
So lets discuss some of the concerns with the migration from 500 to the 1,000 ppi fingerprint system. While getting a higher resolution fingerprint image should give agencies a more accurate fingerprint search is a logical assumption, the question is with the interim solution migrating to the higher resolution system will this assumption be true ? Running a system with fingerprint search database of 500ppi. and 1,000ppi. fingerprint images will create challenges for the fingerprint coders and matchers. The images are not the same size and they each are compressed using different compression algorithms with different ratios of compression. Will the interim fingerprint search system be able to match the current fingerprint system accuracy? The interim system would capture new fingerprint images at 1K ppi. and if an identification is made, replace the lower resolution fingerprint image with the new higher resolution fingerprint image. It is possible some states could manually convert all the hardcopy fingerprint cards in their database, reducing the number of lower resolution fingerprint cards left in the database as well as reducing the length of time they run the dual system. Remember so many fingerprint cards have been captured electronically over the last few years and these fingerprint images captured at 500 ppi cannot be interpolated up to 1,000 ppi. A big question is will the minutiae extraction algorithms and matcher algorithms be affected by having a mixed resolution database ? Each vendor,each agency, each version of afis software may be impacted a little or a lot. Remember the fingerprint minutiae extraction programs were developed for 500 ppi images and not for a dual resolution fingerprint systems. This is a question that has not been answered. I have not heard of any fingerprint system accuracy tests involving fingerprint systems with dual resolution fingerprint databases. I would also point out that most vendors test in a controlled situation with good quality fingerprint images to get the high fingerprint accuracy rates. In the real world the fingerprint accuracy rates are significantly lower because of poorly taken tenprints and partial latent images. In my experience the hit rate for latent fingerprint searches is seldom above 15%, this percentage is based on the number of unknown latent fingerprints entered into the system that are identified. Every examiner knows that getting a latent fingerprint hit is more dependent on the quality of the tenprint fingerprint image in the database than anything else. So whether the fingerprint card is captured at 500 ppi. or at 1K ppi the fingerprint accuracy, will be dependent on the quality of the fingerprint images captured at the livescan unit and how the matchers and coders handle dual fingerprint resolutions.

Fingerprint Search Database, not all created equal

The make up of today’s fingerprint search databases have evolved from databases primarily made up of criminal fingerprint cards, to systems that now include significant numbers of non-criminal applicant and permit fingerprint cards. These criminal background checks have been a tremendous benefit to public safety and in all likelihood prevented numerous crimes, some of which would have led to serious injury or death. As the number of non-criminal records increase it becomes even more critical that the fingerprint search databases and procedures adhere to the highest standards to decrease the possibility of error. The Brandon Mayfield case in Oregon is probably the most recognizable case where an individual was wrongly identified using fingerprint. There are quite a number of other cases, the individual stopped in CA. for a traffic infraction but based on a fingerprint criminal history, was wrongly incarcerated. In the lawsuits that followed, it was found the error had occurred 4 years earlier and the state was aware of 97 other similar identification errors. The cause of the error was attributed to hardware problem. As is apparent from the last example, the error may not become apparent until years later and can be difficult to get corrected.
Are the images in all the state search databases the same, unfortunately, they are not, the fingerprints in each state search database are dictated by state statute. Every state requires felony arrests be captured and submitted and stored in the state repository, not all states require all misdemeanors to be fingerprinted and stored at the state level. The non-criminal applicant and permit cards are also dictated by state statute, with some non-criminal cards retained by the state and some returned to the submitting agency. The FBI and NY state have specific guidelines on what they can accept and store in their respective search databases. When a fingerprint card is processed that cannot be retained the software insures that after processing the electronic images and alpha-numeric data are not retained in the search database. Not all states adhere to these standards and in some situations non-criminal cards after processing are to the submitting agency, the electronic images and alpha-numeric information are stored in the search database and become part of the fingerprint searche database. I’m sure if the legislature required the card be returned, their intent would be the electronic copies of fingerprint images and alpha-numeric information be destroyed.The questions that this brings up are:
1) A latent print is identified to a fingerprint that there is no state statute requiring the state to store the print in the search database, will the court accept the print or toss the evidence?
2) An error occurs and a criminal history is associated with the non-criminal history, that should have been returned, is the state liable ?

Lets look at the fingerprint images and how they are stored in the search database. The images stored could be:
A) the original fingerprint event creating the record.
B) a composite image, the search iamges are created from the best images from multiple cards.
C) All the fingerprint cards that come in are stored are stored in the search database.
Just to add a little more diversity to the database search fingerprint images they can be stored at 500ppi, 1000ppi or a combination at both resolutions.Lets look at how the images are stored:
A) The FBI database uses the originating fingerprint card, the 1st. event. If subsequent cards have better quality images they update the new minutiae (points of identification used in the search), a good way to process.
B) The composite image database is used by many states and if done properly with the policies and procedures can work well, but it is more prone to error than the other methods. If for example you replace a image in the search database from a non-retainable card.
C) The systems that have all the cards available in the search database, probably the best way to store the search images but there would be cost considerations.No matter what system is used the database search images should periodically be reconciled, as part of the system regular maintenance, it is just as critical as backing up the system.

I also will talk about the effect of multiple resolution systems and especially the ones with a composite.The resolution questions will probably be in the next blog.

No matter how good a system purchased the following factors will determine accuracy

In my earlier blog, I discussed accuracy issues inherent in all automated fingerprint identification systems. Now I’d like to discuss what many states fail to realize, system accuracy it is not based solely on the hardware purchased. The factors that most influence system accuracy and performance are usually determined by the choices made by the agency representative(s) during the development of the RFP. There is no doubt that the FBI system is the gold standard in automated fingerprint identification systems, based on the high standards of fingerprint quality they can require for submitted fingerprint cards. Lets look at some of the other factors which significantly impact system accuracy:

The training and experience of the individuals processing the arrest cards. The FBI and NYS have excellent training programs which include in-service, proficiency and remediation training, after the ten print examiner has completed a basic pattern recognition/verification course. Not all states have formalized training programs with many states only requiring the basic course. Agencies should be pro-active in requiring training( in-service, proficiency and remediation programs) to insure the work being produced and entered into the database is accurate.

Staffing and work flow is another area that will impact the accuracy of a system. State production standards and work flows are designed to get the maximum number of fingerprint cards through the system as fast as possible. This means that many systems are designed to default to a hit/miss determination with just a click of the mouse, not requiring the examiner to pause before making the critical decision. An examiner pushing to surpass production targets is prone to error. Contrast this with a latent examiner who can spend a few minutes or a few hours making a determination on a possible identification.

Single vs. double verification of an identification. The FBI and NYS systems initially used a single verification when processing fingerprint cards in the automated fingerprint identifications systems. Both systems moved to a double verification after the error rate using the single verification procedure led to dramatic increases in bad identifications. Many states however rely on a single verification in ten-print processing, these systems are prone to error. I would also point out that as states continue to increase the number of non-criminal cards processed, $ liability exposure for the state increases.

Database maintenance, the FBI makes available to the state records that may be discrepant. While these discrepant record lists are useful, not all states follow-up and reconcile these records. Since the FBI does not have all the state cards (poor quality and many app’s) the FBI list is only a partial reconciliation list. States should have a database reconciliation plan to insure the integrity of the database records. I know of one system where there were 1,200 records with only fingerprint images, no alpha-numeric data (no name,dob,date fingerprinted, reason fingerprinted) but the fingerprints were part of the search database. NY state by contrast has a program that runs regularly scheduled computerized checks of the database to locate and correct discrepant records, in addition to monthly reconciliation with the FBI list of discrepant records.

What I am amazed at is there are no minimum training standards from the FBI for state ten-print examiners, these examiners through the state system are actually entering fingerprints into the national database. All of the factors described above could be addressed at very little, if any additional, cost to agencies. The training, proficiency and remediation costs for ten-print examiners could be handled by any agencies current training budget, it would only require a knowledgeable person setting it up the training/remediation programs. The double verification at agencies with a small staff could be accomplished using lights out technology, and slight adjustment to the current work flow. Agencies pushing production, need to realize how consequential ten print errors can be, the devastating and dramatic effect on public safety as well as the liability exposure to the agency. We’ll discuss latent searches in more detail in the future, but remember the ten print database integrity is critical to latent searching and accuracy (GIGO).

Note, what I have found is an agency that utilizes people with a limited knowledge of how the automated fingerprint identification system works, in the end, spend more money on a more unreliable system.

FBI checking database to make sure it is matching fugitives' fingerprints

The above headline was from an article on the case of Jeremy Jones whose initial Georgia arrest when processed failed to match his fingerprints to a prior fingerprint record in Oklahoma. When a match was not made, a new file in the FBI database was created for "Chapman". Jones was wanted in Oklahoma for jumping bail in 2000, where he was charged with two counts of rape and two counts of sodomy. After the initial missed identification Jones was responsible for 3 homicides. After his arrest he unexpectedly made a startling confession, he also confessed to 13 other murders across six states. The FBI review concluded that even when functioning well, the fingerprint system is 95% to 98% accurate, as it process's 50,000 prints a day. This would mean that the FBI could possibly be missing 1,000 records a day. FBI computer technicians could adjust the computer to produce more potential fingerprint matches in more cases."But that will cost law enforcement time and give you more false positives,".The thing I want to point out is that fingerprint arrest card processing is critical to a good state system and even the best systems produce errors, the consequences from a fingerprint error as you see can be significant. While fingerprint errors resulting in homicides are rare, I know of two (2) other instances where a tenprint fingerprint miss has resulted in additional homicide victims. Usually a missed fingerprint identification results in incorrect criminal history information being associated with an individual, which often results in liability costs for the state. The FBI fingerprint system does have a significant advantage over most state agency fingerprint systems when it comes to accuracy, it can reject poor quality or improperly rolled fingerprint arrest cards. Since the states are often required to accept and process poor quality(reprint not available) fingerprint arrest cards, is highly unlikely that a state system could come close to the FBI IAFIS on fingerprint system accuracy. The result is a state fingerprint database that has questionable fingerprint images in the search database, negatively impacting fingerprint accuracy. A very significant problem with these poor quality fingerprint arrest records, the FBI will not accept and process these fingerprint records, so they will not appear on the FBI criminal history, no NCIC record of that fingerprint event.
Many states rely on a train the trainer concept to get booking officers trained properly in the hope of improving fingerprint image quality, unfortunately because of turnover this concept has not been successful. I would suggest that the proper taking of fingerprints training be a part of all states jail standards and that booking officers be required to attend formal training on the proper techniques required to capture a good set of fingerprint images. In addition to the initial training the booking officers should receive periodic formal in-service refresher training on capturing good quality fingerprints as part of their job requirements.The training should cover capturing fingerprints using both ink & roll and livescan technology, even if it requires hiring a private vendor. Maybe just to start another train of thought, an old idea that has been brought up numerous times by just about all latent fingerprint examiners. Why not go back to the full pattern designation in afis ? central pocket loop whorl etc. It is a way to increase fingerprint accuracy and the Jeremy Jones error probably would not have occurred.